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Guide to the NewD.LMarrlage and Divorce
By Harvey L Zuckman
1. Introduction and
Background
The new District of Columbia Marriage
and Divorce Act, D.C. Law 1-107, which
became effective on April 7, 1977, is an
uneven piece of reform legislation pos-
sessing certain advantages for the public
and the legal profession but lacking a
number of features considered essential
to effective divorce reform by experts in
the field. The irregularity of the legisla-
tion may be explained by the numerous
attempts to reshape the original Council
Bill No. 1-89 to meet objections voiced
by segments of the Bar.
As originally introduced, the bill
closely reflected the Uniform Marriage
and Divorce Act promulgated by the
National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws, and it was vigor-
ously supported during the Council's
public hearings by the District of Colum-
bia's own NCCUSL member Benny L.
Kass. These hearings produced little out-
right opposition to the NCCUSL ap-
proach to divorce reform, which largely
eliminates the consideration of "fault"
from divorce and the collateral matters
of property division, support and child
custody, and reduces the adversary as-
pects of divorce proceedings.
But behind the scenes, there was
strong dissatisfaction with the original
bill from practitioners because it did not
mesh well with many substantive and
technical aspects of family law practice
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in the District of Columbia. Interested
members of the District of Columbia Bar
and the Bar Association of the District
of Columbia met with Councilman Ar-
nngton Dixon, the sponsor of the bill,
and persuaded him that a different ap-
proach was needed. As a result of these
and other meetings, Dixon wrote fellow
councilmember David A. Clarke, chair-
person of the Committee on the Judi-
ciary and Criminal Law, in effect with-
drawing the original bill. In a letter dated
October 7, 1975, Dixon said, "I have
come to the position that the Committee
should consider reform of Chapter 1 of
Title 30 and Chapter 9 of Title 16 of
the [District of Columbia] Code through
a process of amendment-a process of
deletion and addition-rather than the
wholesale repeal and redrafting of those
titles as I originally proposed." This letter
ended the attempt of a "grand design"
divorce reform for the District based on
the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act.
To aid Dixon in the redrafting of
Council Bill 1-89, the Family and Juve-
nile Law Division of the District of
Columbia Bar and the Family Law Sec-
tion of the Bar Association appointed a
joint committee, headed by Marsha E.
Swiss and John V. Long, to advance
proposals for divorce reform. Simplified
non-fault grounds for divorce and the
abolition of illegitimacy are products of
the joint committee's work which sur-
vived, but numerous other committee
proposals were either rejected or modi-
fied by Clarke's committee, or on the
floor of the City Council during several
readings and amended readings of the
bill. Unevenness of product and loss of
focus were the inevitable consequences
of that process.
II. Section-by-Section
Analysis of the Act
1. Section 101, amending D.C. Code
§16-902 (1973). This section reduces
the required residence period for filing a
divorce petition from one year to six
months prior to filing for divorce. In
addition, members of the military are
deemed to have met the residence re-
quirement for divorce if they physically
reside in the District of Columbia con-
tinuously while under military orders.
Comment: The reduced residence re-
quirement coincides with the reduced
period of voluntary separation as a
ground for divorce provided by Section
102(a). While the legislative history
sheds little light on the residence pro-
vision regarding servicemen, it is similar
to one found in Section 302 of the Uni-
form Marriage and Divorce Act and is
apparently designed to overcome the
judicial resistance to permitting service
personnel to qualify for divorce while
stationed in a jurisdiction because of
military orders. The section in effect
creates a conclusive presumption of
domicile in the District of Columbia.
2. Section 102, amending §§16-903.
904. This section eliminates all tradi-
tional "fault" grounds for absolute di-
vorce and adopts a "no-fault" approach.
Grounds for absolute divorce are (a)
mutual, voluntary and continuous sep-
aration for six months and (b) involun-
tary and continuous separation for one
year. Grounds for a bed and board
separation decree are now (a) mutual,
voluntary and continuous separation for
six months; (b) involuntary and con-
tinuous separation for one year; (c)
adultery; and (d) cruelty. For purposes
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of both absolute divorce and bed and
board separation, a voluntary or invol-
untary separation may be effected
though the parties continue to reside
under one roof.
Grounds for annulment are now (a)
bigamy; (b) insanity of either spouse at
the time of the marriage unless there has
been voluntary cohabitation after dis-
covery of the insanity; (c) fraud or co-
ercion in procuring the marriage; (d)
inability of a party to engage in sexual
intercourse at the time of the marriage
without the knowledge of the other
party, and continued incapacity after the
marriage; (e) non-age, but in such cases
only at the suit of the party who had not
attained legal age at the time of the mar-
riage and only if there has not been af-
firmance of the marriage by cohabitation
after legal age is attained.
Comment: This section avoids the de-
finitional pitfall of other no-fault divorce
statutes by making voluntary or involun-
tary separation for a specified period of
time the only basis for absolute divorce.
The Superior Court will not have to
wrestle with the question of whether
there are "irreconcilable differences"
and "irremediable breakdown" of the
marriage. Time apart is the only major
question. Curiously, the fault grounds of
adultery and cruelty are retained for
divorce a mensa.
The Council, in permitting separation
while the parties reside under the same
roof, has clarified existing local case law
on the subject. As the report of the
Council's Committee on the Judiciary
and Criminal Law (dated June 24, 1976)
states, "This provision is meant to stabi-
lize into statutory form a doctrine derived
from court interpretation that the terms
"separate and apart" means 'separate
lives but not separate roofs'. The 'sepa-
rate lives' standard has developed a very
narrow meaning in the case law, allow-
ing very little social intercourse between
the parties, so that living under 'separate
roofs' was practically necessitated...
Under this subsection [(c)] parties who
separate from bed and board clearly
may live in the same dwelling in order
to meet the separation grounds men-
tioned in subsections (2) and (b) of this
section." Report, p. 12.
With the exception of the fraud
ground, the bases for annulment pro-
vided in this section are quite common.
Traditionally, the only fraud that would
justify annulment was that going to the
"essence" of the marriage contract, i.e.,
sexual intercourse and reproduction.
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The broad language of the fraud ground,
taken from the earlier Code provisions,
would permit District of Columbia courts
to take the more modem view that any
fraud actually inducing the marriage,
such as a false promise by a woman to
set the prospective husband up in busi-
ness, is ground for annulment. But the
question is still open in the District as
to what exactly constitutes fraud justify-
ing annulment.
3. Section 103, amending §16-905.
This section permits the court to enlarge
its decree of legal separation to an ab-
solute divorce upon the application of
the spouse originally awarded the
decree if the court finds that (a) no re-
conciliation has taken place and none is
probable; and (b) the separation has
continued voluntarily and without inter-
ruption for at least one year.
Comment: As a result of this section
the court now has the power not only to
revoke decrees of divorce from bed and
board upon the joint application of the
parties, but to move in the opposite
direction to transform such decrees into
absolute divorce upon the application of
the spouse who initially obtained the
separation decree.
4. Section 104, amending §16-907.
This section provides definitions con-
ceming the status of children, the terms
"legitimate" or "legitimated" are de-
fined to mean that the parent-child rela-
tionship exists for all rights, privileges,
duties and obligations under District law.
The term "born out of wedlock" means
only that a child has been born to parents
who, at the time of its birth, were not
married to each other. The term "born
in wedlock" means only that a child has
been born to parents who, at the time of
its birth, were married to each other.
Comment: This definitional section
relates to the substantive provisions of
Section 105.
5. Section 105, amending §16-908.
This section purportedly abolishes the
status of illegitimacy in the District of
Columbia by stating: "A child born in
wedlock or bom out of wedlock is the
legitimate child of its father and mother
and is the legitimate relative of its father's
and mother's relative by blood or adop-
tion."
Comment: This section must be read
in conjunction with Section 22 of the
Anti-Sex Discriminatory Language Act
(D.C. Law 1-97), amending Section 19-
316. That section provides that "illegi-
timate children" and the issue of "illegi-
timate children" are capable of taking
real and personal estates by inheritance
from either parent or from others "as if
born in lawful wedlock" (if parentage is
established) and parents and the respec-
five heirs may inherit from "such chil-
dren." This section of the Anti-Sex Dis-
criminatory Language Act suggests that
it is going to be difficult to eliminate the
term "illegitimate" if not the status itself.
While it is clear from the legislative
history of the Marriage and Divorce Act
that Section 105 is prospective in its ef-
fect insofar as pending litigation is con-
cemed, it is less clear whether persons
born out of wedlock prior to the effective
date of the legislation are legitimated by
the section.
6. Section 106, amending §16-909.
This section establishes the manner of
proving the biological relationship of
mother and child and father and child.
For the mother, giving birth establishes
the relationship. For the father, a re-
buttable presumption of parenthood
arises if (a) he and the child's mother
are or have been married and the child
is bom during the marriage, or within
300 days after marital cohabitation has
terminated; or (b) prior to the child's
birth, he and the child's mother have at-
tempted to marry in apparent com-
pliance with the law and the child is born
during the attempted marriage or within
300 days after its termination; or (c) after
the child's birth, he and the child's
mother marry or attempt to many and
he has acknowledged the child to be his.
If questioned, the presumption of
paternity may be tried and determined
by the Superior Court. The adoptive
parent-adopted child relationship is con-
clusively established by proof of adop-
tion.
Comment: Consistent with the idea of
equality of the sexes, this section pro-
vides the bases for determining the
parental relationship of both males and
females. The factual bases for the de-
termination of paternity are clear cut and
should be relatively easy to establish in
a court of law.
Section 106, with Sections 104 and
105, effectively replace D.C. Code
§§16-907-909 which provide only for
legitimation of the issue of divorced or
annulled marriages. The new code pro-
visions extend legitimation to all off-
spring. See Report, pp. 24-25.
7. Section 107, amending Section
16-910. This section expressly states the
distinction between separate property of
the spouses and their marital property
and indicates how marital or non-sep-
arate property is to be divided upon
absolute divorce or annulment Non-
separate property, however held, is to be
divided in a manner that is "equitable,
just and reasonable." The court must
consider all relevant factors induding (a)
duration of the marriage; (b) prior mar-
riages; (c) age and health; (d) occupa-
tion; (e) amount and sources of income;
(f) vocational skills and employability;
(g) assets, debts and needs of the parties;
(h) needs of any minor children; (i)
whether the distribution is in lieu of or in
addition to maintenance; and (j) oppor-
tunity for future acquisition of assets and
income.
In addition, the court, in making the
division, must also consider each party's
contribution to the "acquisition, preser-
vation, appreciation, dissipation or de-
preciation in value" of the marital prop-
erty. Finally, each party's contribution
as a homemaker or to the family unit
must be taken into consideration.
Comment: This section parallels in
many respects Section 307 of the Uni-
form Marriage and Divorce Act and the
comment thereto may be helpful in
understanding the ramifications of the
present legislation.
8. Section 108, amending §16-911.
This section adds garnishment of wages
and assignments of income to the exist-
ing attachment power in order to enforce
orders for alimony pendente lite and suit
money; obliges stakeholders such as
employers to honor garnishments, as-
signments and attachments, and pro-
tects employees from discharge or other
sanctions upon application of these en-
forcement devices against employers.
The section also completely revamps
the existing law on child custody dur-
ing proceedings for divorce or annul-
ment, by establishing the "best interest
of the child" test as the basis for award-
ing temporary custody. The relevant fac-
tors to be considered in determining the
best interest of the child include (but are
not limited to): (a) the wishes of the child
where practicable; (b) the wishes of the
child's parents; (c) the interaction and
interrelationship of the child with par-
ents, siblings and any other person who
may emotionally or psychologically af-
fect the child's best interest; (d) the
child's adjustment to his or her home,
school and community and (e) the men-
tal and physical health of all individuals
involved.
Comment: The provisions relating to
the enforcement of court orders award-
ing alimony pendente lite and suit
money are straightforward and should
strengthen such orders. The addition of
wage garnishment to the enforcement
arsenal permits beneficiaries of orders
for alimony and suit money to take ad-
vantage of the Federal Social Services
Amendments of 1974 (P.L 93-647)
which now allow garnishment of wages
of federal employees. Prior to the 1974
Act, the federal government refused to
honor writs of garnishment or attach-
ment on the ground of sovereign im-
munity. New regulations of the Civil
Service Commission instructing federal
agencies and military branches on how
to handle garnishment for court ordered
alimony and child support will soon go
into effect, easing the problems of en-
forcement. Moreover, the District of Col-
umbia Council may soon enact parallel
legislation coverrig District of Columbia
municipal employees.
The provisions relating to child cus-
tody are patterned on Sections 402 and
403 of the Uniform Marriage and Di-
vorce Act and the comments to these
sections provided by the drafters will be
of interest in attempting to understand
the District's provisions. One sentence
included in the UMDA but missing from
the local version is "the court shall not
consider conduct of a proposed cus-
todian that does not affect his relation-
ship to the child." The absence of this
provision implies that Superior Court
judges may continue to consider fault of
the parties in custody adjudications. In
particular cases such consideration may
be inconsistent with the best interest of
the child.
Section 16-911 is also amended by
Section 14 of the Anti-Sex Discrimina-
tory Language Act to Insure equal treat-
ment of the sexes regarding enforcement
of temporary orders and temporary cus-
tody.
9. The Marriage and Divorce Act
does not amend § 16-912, relating to the
award of permanent alimony, or §16-
913, relating to the award of alimony to
a wife upon the grant of divorce to a
husband.
Comment: The failure to modernize
these provisions permits fault to con-
tinue to play a significant part in the
award of permanent alimony.
These sections are amended by Sec-
tions 15 and 16 of the Anti-Sex Dis-
criminatory Language Act to insure
equality of the sexes in the award of
permanent alimony.
10. Section 109, amending §16-914.
The original section of the Code, provid-
ing for retention of Superior Court
jurisdiction following awards of perma-
nent alimony and custody, is amended
by Section 109 to require notice of a
custody proceeding to the child's
parents, guardian or other custodian and
to permit intervention in the custody
proceeding by any interested party.
In addition, Section 109 adopts the
same "best interest of the child" test and
the determinative criteria therefor, as set
forth in Section 108.
Comment This section is based upon
provisions in Sections 401-03 of the
UMDA The drafters' comments to those
sections of the UMDA should be con-
sulted in determining the meaning of
Section 109.
Section 16-914 is also amended by
Section 17 of the Anti-Sex Discrimina-
tory Language Act to include the words
"with respect to matters of custody and
visitation, the race, color, national origin,
political affiliation, sex, or sexual orienta-
tion, in and of itself, of a party shall not
be a conclusive consideration." It would
seem, then, that even the homosexuality
of a parent, by itself, should not affect
his or her right to custody or visitation.
11. The Marriage and Divorce Act
does not amend § 16-915, providing for
restoration of a woman's maiden name
at the discretion of the court §16-916,
providing for support and maintenance
of wives, former wives and minor chil-
dren; or §16-917, requiring the joinder
of co-respondents.
Comment Given the no-fault thrust
of Section 102(a) of the new act elim-
inating all fault grounds for absolute
divorce it is surprising, to say the least,
that §16-917 was not repealed.
Sections 16-915 and 16-916 are
amended by Sections 18 and 19, re-
spectively, of the Anti-Sex Discrimina-
tory Language Act to insure equal treat-
ment of the sexes as to name changes
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and support maintenance.
12. Section 110, amending §16-
918. This section eliminates the re-
quirement that in all uncontested di-
vorce actions the court must appoint
counsel to represent the defendant re-
gardless of whether he or she wishes to
be represented. However, the section
makes clear that where the court deems
it necessary or proper, it may appoit
counsel to represent the defendant in
any action brought under Chapter 9 of
Title 16 of the Code and may also ap-
point counsel to represent the child's
interests in such actions.
The section also provides for the auto-
matic termination of the appearance of
counsel in any action under Chapter 9.
Automatic termination for the purpose
of service of any motion, process or any
other pleading occurs upon completion
of the case in a judgment, adjudication,
decree or final order when the time al-
lowed for appeal expires. If notice of ap-
peal is entered, termination of the ap-
pearance occurs upon the date of final
disposition of the appeal. However, the
court may suspend termination of the
appearance on its own motion or on the
motion of any party to the case prior to
the expiration of the time designated for
appeal.
Comment: Section 110 eliminates
one of the most annoying features of
the District's divorce law-mandatory
appointment of defense counsel in un-
contested divorce actions. This require-
ment simply added to the cost of divorce
in many cases without any real justifica-
tion, and left the Bar vulnerable to the
charge that it was a device insisted upon
by its members to line their pockets. Very
often, however, appointed defense
counsel realized little or no financial gain
from such appointments because of the
indigency of the parties. The elimination
of the mandatory appointment provision
should be beneficial to both the con-
sumer of legal services and the practi-
tioner.
The automatic termination of appear-
ance provisions should also provide
needed guidelines regarding the dura-
tion of an attorney's representation in
divorce, annulment, separation, alimony
and custody proceedings.
13. Section 111, adding new §16-
923. Section 11 abolishes the com-
mon law "heartbalm" actions for breach
of promise, alienation of affection and
criminal conversation.
Comment: These outmoded common
law actions, fashioned by male judges
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to deal with the emotions and chastity
of females, were long overdue for elimi-
nation.
14. Sections 112-115, amending
§16-2345, 21-104, 30-110, 30-
116 and 30-320. These sections provide
for the (a) elimination from amended
birth certificates of the fact that parentage
has been established by judicial process
or by acknowledgement; (b) amend-
ment of § 21-104 to add marriage as
a basis for the termination of a natural
or appointive guardianship; (c) amend-
ment of § 30-110 to eliminate desig-
nation of skin color in applications for
marriage certificate; (d) repeal of § 30-
116, which legitimized formal or in-
formal marriages and offspring of such
marriages between "colored" persons
united prior to July 26, 1866; and (e)
amendment of § 30-320 by striking the
words "under oath," thus permitting
acknowledgment of paternity without
the need for formal oath taking.
Comment: The changes provided
here are for the most part designed to
modernize antiquated and racially offen-
sive provisions of the District of Colum-
bia Code.
15. Section 201, amending § 13-
340. This section permits service by
publication on certain nonresident or
absent defendants by posting the order
of publication in the Clerk's Office of the
Family Division, Superior Court of the
District of Columbia, when the plaintiff
is unable to pay the cost of publishing
the requisite notice in the print media
without substantial hardship.
Comment This amendment shows
concern for the plight of indigents in
domestic relations litigation as well as
for their constitutional rights. Cf. Boddie
y. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
16. Section 202, amending § 15-
712. This section permits indigent
plaintiffs and defendants to petition the
District of Columbia Superior Court in
any non-criminal action or proceeding
to waive the prepayment of fees and
court costs or the posting of security
therefor and empowers Superior Court
judges to waive such fees, costs or
security.
The section also establishes a pre-
sumption of indigency for those who re-
ceive public assistance under the District
of Columbia Aid to Families with De-
pendent Children Program or the Gen-
eral Public Assistance Program or who
receive assistance under Title XVI of the
Social Security Act (the Supplemental
Security Income Program).
Comment: This section clarifies exist-
ing law on the waiver of fees, costs and
security for indigents and provides
needed standards for determining indi-
gency.
III. Assessment of the Act
As noted at the outset the new act is
very uneven and on some points is even
philosophically inconsistent, e.g., per-
mitting retention of co-respondents as
defendants in divorce cases where adul-
tery is charged at the same time fault is
eliminated as a basis for absolute di-
vorce. And even though fault is elim-
inated for absolute divorce, it is not elim-
inated as a factor in bed and board
divorce, alimony, support and child cus-
tody. Again, while specific criteria for the
division of marital property and the
award of custody are set down, no such
criteria are provided for the award of
temporary or permanent alimony or
support.
It should not be overlooked, however,
that the act contains a number of praise-
worthy features, including no-fault ab-
solute divorce with easily enforceable
standards, enlightened criteria for the
division of marital property and the
award of custody, the attempted aboli-
tion of the status of illegitimacy, the
development of rational bases for pre-
suming paternity, the abolition of man-
datory appointment of defense counsel
in all uncontested cases, the abolition
of the antique "heartbalm" actions and
the strong recognition of indigents' rights
in domestic relations proceedings. These
are achievements of which the drafters
may be understandably proud.
The act is, in short, a "half-way
house" between the fault oriented,
moralistic and often irrational domestic
relations law of the past, and the mod-
em realism of partnership dissolution
embodied in such functional legislative
schemes as the Uniform Marriage and
Divorce Act, the new California Family
Law Act and the new Iowa no-fault di-
vorce act. But it must be conceded that
our new act will probably function tol-
erably until that segment of the Bar inter-
ested in family law is prepared to accept
a master scheme of legislation like the
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act,
which has a definite point of view and is
drafted so that each section is consistent
with the central philosophy of eliminat-
ing fault and adversariness from the di-
vorce process. U
